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Abstract 
With temperatures in the Arctic rising at twice the pace of anywhere else in the 
world, the European Union (EU)  decided in 2008 to begin formulating an overall 
Arctic policy tackling maritime, environmental, energy and transport challenges. This 
attempt to draft a comprehensive policy on a topic that the EU had rarely touched 
upon unavoidably ran up against other existing strategies from Arctic and non-Arctic 
states. Against this background, this paper examines whether the EU’s current Arctic 
policy is conducive to framing a strategy that is both correctly targeted and flexible 
enough to represent Europe’s interests. It shows that the EU’s approach can serve as 
an effective foreign policy tool to establish  the  Union’s  legitimacy as an Arctic 
player. However, the EU’s Arctic policy  is  still underestimating its  potential to find 
common grounds with the strategic partners Russia and China. A properly targeted 
Arctic policy could help influence Russia over the EU’s interests in the Northern Sea 
Route and strengthen cooperation with China in an endeavour to gain recognition 
as relevant Arctic players. 
 Julien Daemers 
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1.   Introduction:  the EU’s emerging Arctic policy  
“You never really know your friends from  
your enemies until the ice breaks” 
“Change is the only constant” 
Inuit proverbs 
 
The ‘Arctic’ has figured for a long time as the kingdom of ice, polar bears and 
pioneer adventurers.1 It fed the imagination of more than one child going to bed 
after having read Jules Verne’s The Adventures of Captain Hatteras.2 Nowadays, it 
rather tends to relate to climate change.  The  ‘Arctic’  has many definitions. As 
correctly and playfully remarked by Archer, the definition of the ‘Arctic’  is much 
more complicated than the definition of ‘Europe’.3 One version is  limited to the 
Arctic Ocean, another to the area within the Arctic Circle. Both have weaknesses. 
On the one hand, the Arctic should not relate only to ice-covered waters. On the 
other hand, the Arctic Circle is an artificial man-made line. The most commonly 
agreed definition of the Arctic today is the area around the North Pole, where the 
monthly maximum temperature is below 10 degrees Celsius: the 10°C isotherm line. 
Hereinafter, the ‘Arctic’ will relate to this definition. 
Challenges in the ice-melting Arctic 
The melting of the Arctic ice leads to challenges related to security, 
environment, economic opportunities and multilateral governance.  First, in recent 
years, the media have relayed security concerns about the development of a so-
called ’new Cold War’ in the Arctic. Basing their analysis mainly on a ‘new scramble’ 
for Arctic resources, these media forget to mention  that the  Arctic has been 
governed since 1982 by the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and that political cooperation has never been stronger than now among 
Arctic coastal states. It is true that these states  are investing in modernizing and 
                                                 
1 Such as Fridtjof Nansen (the first to drift across the Arctic Ocean in order to reach the North 
Pole in 1893), Roald Amundsen (the first to sail through the North West Passage without 
interruption between 1903 and 1906), Robert Peary and Matthew Henson (the first persons to 
reach the North Pole in 1909), or more recently Jean-Louis Etienne (who reached the North 
Pole using a sleigh in 1986), Alain Hubert and Didier Goethebuer (who reached the North Pole 
in 94 days without assistance through the Canadian Arctic in 1994). 
2 J. Verne, The Extraordinary Journeys: The Adventures of Captain Hatteras, translated by 
William Butcher, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
3 C. Archer, “An EU Arctic Policy?”, Paper prepared for the UACES Conference, Bruges, 6-8 
September 2010, p. 2. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
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increasing the proportion of their military forces able to intervene in the Arctic 
region.4 However, the degree of cooperation5 among these military forces tends to 
suggest that the coastal states  are trying to gain the  capacity to patrol their 
enlarging territory rather than to prepare a military confrontation.6 
Second, environmental challenges and the protection of indigenous peoples’ 
lifestyles  have gained more attention.  As temperatures in the Arctic are rising at 
twice the pace of anywhere else in the world, the Arctic is melting away faster than 
ever before.7 Moreover, the ice melting reduces the average albedo of the region, 
which accelerates climate change at local and global levels. It should be noted 
that this reduction of summer ice is irregular between one year and another, so it is 
difficult to predict the size of the summer ice-pack and when these waters are going 
to freeze again. In addition, while the melting of the ice-pack does not affect global 
sea levels, the melting of the inlandsis (the Greenlandic ice cover) does contribute to 
the rise in these levels. Both factors increase the number of icebergs drifting in Arctic 
waters. 8 While scientists still disagree on the point, this analysis will adopt the 
assumption that it may take 20-30 years for the Arctic Ocean to be truly ice-free in 
summer. Further, physical changes have a tremendous effect on the lifestyle of 
indigenous people,9 whether in terms of hunting traditions (reindeer moving to the 
south), the increase in shipping, or hydrocarbon industry in the region. 
Third,  the melting Arctic  offers new economic opportunities  with regard to 
shipping lanes and the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. Due to the Arctic ice 
melting, in the medium to long term, the North West Passage (NWP) through the 
Canadian archipelago and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the coast of Siberia 
can constitute new routes for the world’s shipping industry. In comparison with the 
other major shipping lanes, namely the Suez Canal and the Malacca Strait, the use 
of the NWP and the NSR could shorten by many thousand kilometres the journey 
between major international ports. Indeed, in pure distance terms, a journey 
between Rotterdam and Shanghai is faster through the NSR than through the 
                                                 
4 S.T. Wezeman, “Military capabilities in the Arctic”, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) Background Paper, March 2012, pp. 13-14. 
5 T. Pettersen, “Arctic generals agree on closer ties”, Barents Observer, 17 April 2012. 
6 Ibid. 
7 During the last 100 years, the Arctic annual average temperature has doubled.  
8  F. Lasserre, “Changements climatiques dans l’Arctique –  Vers la disparition de la 
banquise ?”, in F. Lasserre (ed.), Passages et mers arctiques – Géopolitiques d’une région en 
mutation, Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2010, pp. 11-32. 
9 Representing approximately 400 000 inhabitants (10% of the overall Arctic population). Julien Daemers 
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Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. However, observers are divided on whether 
using the Arctic routes is financially interesting for companies. For instance, a 
Marseille-Shanghai journey is shorter through the Suez Canal than through the NSR.10 
Moreover, the profits made from a shorter journey have to be counterbalanced by 
the supplementary costs caused by the slower speed, insurance costs, the need for 
icebreakers, and unexpected expenses. 
  Pending newer publications, the 2008 US Geological Survey estimates the 
Arctic hydrocarbon reserves as follows: 13% of the undiscovered oil and 30% of the 
undiscovered gas in the planet.11 However, it seems that 95% of these reserves are 
located within nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones  (EEZ). 12 It thus seems that the 
notion of a race for the Arctic hydrocarbons is highly exaggerated, as sovereignty 
over most of them is not contested. As to the economic part of the equation, most of 
these new fields are offshore, facing exploration and exploitation companies with 
the need for hi-tech and highly expensive drilling technologies, which most countries 
involved – with the exception of Norway – do not possess.  
Moreover, both the long-term development of shipping lines and the 
exploitation of hydrocarbon fields will rely on the availability of Search and Rescue 
(SAR) facilities in the NWP and the NSR. For the moment, SAR facilities are lacking in 
both passages, notably in the NWP13 and the eastern part of the NSR14, where there 
is virtually no harbour ready to receive damaged vessels.15 
Fourth, the international legal regime and multilateral governance  plays a 
role. Unlike the Antarctica, which is a continent covered by ice, the Arctic is mainly 
governed by the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea. With the 
                                                 
10 Based on Lasserre’s calculation in F. Lasserre, “China and the Arctic: threat or cooperation 
potential for Canada?”, China Papers, no. 11, Centre of International Relations, Canadian 
International Council, University of British Columbia, June 2010, p. 6. 
11 P. Stauffer (ed.), Circum-Arctic resource appraisal: estimates of undiscovered oil and gas 
north of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049, May 2008. These data 
are not proven reserves but potential reserves calculated according to the best available 
geological knowledge. 
12 From the state’s baseline up to 200 nautical miles, as stated in the UNCLOS, a state enjoys 
economic rights over the EEZ (sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and 
managing natural resources). 
13 K. Espen Solberg, “The Impact of the Arctic Council cooperation agreement on air and sea 
search and rescue (SAR) on the safety of shipping”, Presentation at Arctic Futures Symposium, 
Final report, 12-14 October 2011, Brussels, p. 31. 
14 M. Bennett, “Russia pushes development of Northern Sea Route”, Eye on the Arctic, 14 
August 2012. 
15 Concerning the westerrt of the NSR, most of the SAR facilities are from Soviet times and 
need to be renovated in order to be fully operational. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
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exception of the United States of America, which considers the UNCLOS as part of 
customary international law,16 all the Arctic circumpolar states  are parties to  the 
Convention and consider it as the primary component of the international legal 
regime of the region.17 Moreover, in addition to several sub-regional organisations 
dealing with specific topics and areas of the Arctic, the Arctic Council (AC) provides 
a  dedicated  regional cooperation forum treating issues faced by the Arctic 
governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic. Established in 1996, this 
intergovernmental forum with no formal decision-making powers comprises all five of 
the circumpolar states as well as Iceland, Sweden and Finland and six indigenous 
peoples’ organisations.  
The formation of the EU’s Arctic Policy 
Based on a proposal of the European Commission in its 2008 Communication 
on “the European Union and the Arctic region”, the Council of the European Union 
decided in December 200918 upon the development of a European Union  Arctic 
Policy (EUAP).19 This EUAP was articulated around three objectives: 
-        Protecting and preserving the Arctic in harmony with its peoples;  
-        Promoting the sustainable use of natural resources; 
-        Contributing to enhanced governance in the Arctic through the implementation 
of relevant agreements, frameworks and arrangements,  and their further 
development.20 
 
Aside from related actions in the fields of research, environment and maritime 
issues, the Council supported the Commission’s  application for a Permanent 
Observer Status within the AC in order  to contribute to the work of the different 
working groups and thus increase the legitimacy of the European Union as a relevant 
Arctic player.21 Though officially supported by six AC members – Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Iceland and the US – this application was rejected in April 2009 
                                                 
16 While the US Congress never ratified the Convention, the US has considered UNCLOS in its 
entirety as part of customary international law, with the exception of Part XI of the 
Convention providing for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed outside any state's 
territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zones. 
17 Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, The 
Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, 27-29 May 2008. 
18  Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Arctic issues, 16826/08, Brussels, 8 
December 2009. 
19 European Commission, The European Union and the Arctic Region, COM(2008) 763 final, 
Brussels, 20 November 2008. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Arctic issues, op.cit., §17. Julien Daemers 
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mainly due to the opposition of Canada, with which the EU was facing tense 
relations because of the seal product ban, combined with the European Parliament 
proposal for an Arctic Treaty.22 Since then, the EU has  reiterated  its application, 
which is due to be discussed during the next AC Ministerial meeting in May 2013. 
After a period of relative stagnation,  the  EUAP  was expected to be 
reinvigorated  in June 2011 by a mid-term report requested in the Council 
Conclusions. This report by the Commission and the High Representative appeared a 
year late, in June 2012.23 Bringing few novelties in the substance of the EUAP,24 the 
joint report nevertheless makes new efforts to present the EU’s involvement in the 
region as “supportive of the efforts of Arctic states"25 and to take into account "the 
needs of indigenous and local communities".26 It is clearly an attempt to reassure the 
Arctic  states  about the aims of the EUAP.  Moreover, it  interestingly  draws  the 
attention to the interface between Space and the Arctic in identifying how the EU 
Space Policy could be an asset for the EUAP.27 Finally, the fact that this assessment 
was made public just before the end of the Danish Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union may illustrate the actual and/or perceived Danish lack of support for 
an enhanced EUAP.28  
The EUAP has so far been characterised by a relative lack of interest among 
individual  EU  member states.  Among the EU  members who are also in the Arctic 
Council, Denmark gives a bare minimum of support to the policy, while Sweden and 
Finland are more committed to an institutional approach given their resentment at 
being left out of separate policy meetings by the ‘littoral Five’ states  (Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA). Among other EU member states only France, 
                                                 
22 Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Trade in 
Seal products adopted on 16 September 2009, Official Journal of the European Union, L 286, 
31  October 2009, pp. 36-39; European Parliament, Resolution on Arctic Governance, 
P6_TA(2008)0474, Strasbourg, 9 October 2008; and European Parliament, Joint Motion for a 
Resolution on the International Treaty for the Protection of the Arctic, RC/778935EN, 
Strasbourg, 30 March 2009. 
23 European Commission and the HR, Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic 
Region: progress since 2008 and next steps, JOIN(2012)19 final, Brussels, 26 June 2012. 
24 Notably in listing the EU’s actions in the Arctic since 2008. 
25 European Commission and the HR, Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic 
Region, op.cit., p. 5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 European Commission and the HR, Space and the Arctic, SWD(2012)183 final, Brussels, 26 
June 2012. 
28 Denmark, as a member of the EU, NATO and the ‘Arctic 5’, is in a paradoxical position and 
has turned out to be the least supportive EU member state in the formation of the EUAP. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
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the UK and Germany have begun to articulate interests in the region; Central and 
Southeast European member states perceive the Arctic as peripheral. 
In addition to the member states’ perceptions of the EUAP, the formulation of 
the  policy itself is  atypical.  The  European Parliament took the most controversial 
positions 29  at the  beginning  of  the formulation of the  EU policy, 30  while the 
Commission sought to manage its knowledge deficit through a pragmatic policy-
drafting process. The epicentre of Commission work was DG MARE (maritime affairs) 
rather than RELEX (external affairs). The  creation of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS)  should have helped draw together the different dimensions of EU 
policy, but the Service itself is still looking for its role in the institutional framework.31 
Against this background, this study examines whether the EU’s current Arctic 
policy is conducive to framing a strategy that is both correctly targeted and flexible 
enough to represent Europe's most essential interests in this matter.  While 
demonstrating that this policy could be an effective foreign policy tool to frame the 
legitimacy of the EU as an Arctic actor, the paper argues that the EU is underrating 
the EUAP’s potential to find common grounds with two of its most important partners, 
namely Russia and China. 
Although the Arctic literature is relatively large overall, academic literature 
specifically focusing on the EUAP is rather limited. Therefore, this research is based on 
three main types of materials: public documents, academic literature with a 
particular focus on extra-European literature, and finally on interviews with member 
states’ officials and EU officials.  
Sections 2 and 3 will provide an analysis on the ability of the EUAP to impact 
the EU’s relations with other partners on Arctic issues. On the one hand, the formation 
of policy towards a region that includes Europe’s High North is bound to be linked, in 
one way or another, to the relationship the EU maintains with Russia. It is therefore 
                                                 
29 Following the activism of several parliamentarians, the European Parliament adopted a 
controversial resolution in October 2008 supporting the negotiation of a new legal regime for 
the Arctic and raising security concerns in the Arctic. Moreover, in 2009 it adopted an EU 
trade ban on seal products, thereby damaging the EU’s image among Arctic indigenous 
populations (despite an EC regulation of August 2010 exempting the Indigenous Communities 
of Greenland and Canada from the ban). 
30 More recently, the Parliament adopted in early 2011 a more moderate resolution asking for 
a “sustainable policy in the High North”. European Parliament, Resolution on a sustainable EU 
policy for the High North, 2009/2214(INI), Strasbourg, 20 January 2011. 
31 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Europe and Central Asia Division of the 
EEAS shares responsibility for the topic, but lacks involvement in both the internal drafting and 
the external representation of the policy. Julien Daemers 
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relevant to analyse the EUAP as a potential way to overcome unresolved tensions in 
relations with Russia as well as to strengthen the positive aspects. On the other hand, 
a certain convergence of interests between the EU and China on Arctic issues may 
be detected, which could lead to a potential cooperation in their efforts to be 
recognised as relevant Arctic players. The conclusions will recall the main findings. 
2.   The EUAP: a way to overcome tense relations with Russia? 
The EU and Russia are facing tense bilateral energy relations, which have an 
impact on other areas of their relationship.32 Contrary to the popular belief and as 
already mentioned  above,  the Arctic coastal states  do not contest each other’s 
sovereignty over Arctic hydrocarbon resources. The main controversy between the 
EU and Russia concerns commercial shipping in the NSR. However, it  should be 
possible to overcome  these tensions in view of  Russia’s need for partnership in 
exploiting its new economic assets:  that is,  its opening shipping lanes and newly 
exploitable hydrocarbon fields. 
Shipping lanes: the hottest topic between Russia and the EU in the Arctic 
Legal controversies over the NSR status and its consequences for EU shipping access 
Due to different views  on  UNCLOS provisions, the EU and Russia do not 
interpret the legal status of the Northern Sea Route in the same way. As a 
consequence, the Russian authorities have enacted regulations limiting the right of 
innocent passage in what the EU considers the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone.33 
This debate is illustrated by the fact that Russia calls the shipping route along its 
Northern coast the ‘Northern Sea Route’, while the EU used to call it the ‘North-East 
Passage’. As things stand, the use of the Russian term by all major Arctic stakeholders 
                                                 
32 See  for instance  K. Westphal, “Russian Gas, Ukrainian Pipelines and European Supply 
Security – Lessons of the 2009 Controversies”, SWP Research Paper, September 2009, Berlin. 
33 UNCLOS divides sovereignty over sea areas into three categories: First, a state exercises full 
sovereignty in its internal waters (between the state’s coastline and its baseline). Second, it 
exercises full sovereignty over its territorial waters, with a right of innocent passage for foreign 
ships (from the baseline up to 20 miles). Third, from the baseline up to 200 miles, the coastal 
state enjoys economic rights in its EEZ (for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing 
natural resources), but foreign vessels can navigate with no restrictions. From 200 miles from 
the baseline onwards, the high seas are open to all states with no restrictions. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
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gives a fairly good perception of the power balance in the EU-Russia legal debate 
over the NSR.34 
From a legal perspective, two arguments are adduced by Russia to support its 
regulatory approach. First, Russia considers that a large part of the Northern Sea 
Route35 is situated in its internal waters and not within its EEZ, which implies a legal 
possibility to refuse access for foreign vessels. It considers that, due to geographic 
necessity, the baseline for determining sea borders should not follow the Russian 
coastline (which is the ‘normal’  method under article 5 UNCLOS) but should be 
determined using the ‘straight’ baseline method. Indeed, article 7 UNCLOS allows a 
state to delimit its baseline using this method subject to several criteria: 
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. [emphasis added] 
 
Based on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),36 this 
exception allowed Norway to determine its baseline using a straight method in 
consequence of its particularly winding coastline.37 The European Union does not 
agree with this application of article 7 UNCLOS for the Russian coast, which does not 
comply with the criteria set up by the ICJ and UNCLOS. 
Second, the Russian authorities consider that article 234 UNCLOS on ‘ice-
covered waters’ should be applied to the NSR:  
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from 
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering 
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to 
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to 
                                                 
34 The EU supported the use of the term ‘North-East Passage’ for a long time, while recent 
documents use ‘North East Passage‘ and ‘Northern Sea Route’ as synonyms. See European 
Commission, Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 
2018, COM(2009) 8 final, Brussels, 21 January 2009, p. 7; and A. Moe & Ø. Jensen, Opening of 
New Arctic Shipping Routes, Standard Briefing, Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, European Parliament, Brussels, 2010. 
35 For the purpose of this research, the analysis will focus on the Coastal Route of the Northern 
Sea Route, which is most likely to be used in the near future because it requires fewer 
icebreakers to navigate than the Transit Route (which, unlike the Coastal Route, passes north 
of the Novaya Zemlya Island, the Severnaya Zemlya Islands and the New Siberian Islands). 
36 International Court of Justice, The  Fisheries Case  (United Kingdom against Norway), 
Judgment of 18 December 1951. 
37  For information, Canada has used the same argument to enact far-reaching 
environmental legislation limiting the right of innocent passage for foreign vessels.  Julien Daemers 
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or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations 
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. [emphasis 
added] 
 
Applying this article would allow Russia to ‘adopt and enforce’ environmental 
regulations on the grounds both of geography and temporality. However, the article 
is notably open for interpretation: it uses subjective terms such as ‘particularly’ or 
‘most of the year’ or ‘exceptional’; ‘major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the 
ecological balance’; and last but not least, ‘based on the best available scientific 
evidence’.38 The EU disputes the interpretation of these subjective terms in order to 
contest the de facto right taken by Russia to enact severe environmental regulation 
obstructing full access to the NSR for the EU shipping industry. 
Specifically, the Russian authorities make it compulsory for shipping companies 
to request an authorisation for navigation in the NSR from the Ministry of 
Transportation four months prior to their journey.39 The time taken to process these 
requests is apparently too long in comparison with the strict schedule of shipping 
companies.40 The Russians also impose the use of icebreakers for security reasons, 
which costs approximately 14’000 dollars a day per icebreaker.41 It should be added 
that the vast majority of available icebreakers in the world are Russian property.42 All 
these additional costs in combination make the cost-benefit balance less attractive 
for shipping companies. 
Interestingly, recent Russian actions are shedding a different light on the Russian 
will to limit the right of innocent passage. The Duma recently passed a new law on 
                                                 
38 For a complete explanation of the ambiguities of article 234 UNCLOS, see K. Bartenstein, 
“Chapitre 12 – Les pouvoirs du Canada de protéger le milieu marin dans l’archipel arctique”, 
in F. Lasserre (ed.), Passages et mers arctiques – Géopolitiques d’une région en mutation, 
Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2010, pp. 267-289. 
39 European Commission, Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Legal aspects 
of Arctic shipping – Summary Report, Brussels, 2010, p. 16. 
40 Insights provided by Laurent Mayet, special advisor of the French Ambassador at Large for 
Polar issues, during a conference: L. Mayet, “Les enjeux de l’Arctique”, Speech delivered at 
the Café-Défense Mission Lille Euroméditerranée Conference, 27 March 2012, Lille, France; 
and R. Kefferpütz, “On Thin Ice? (Mis)interpreting Russian Policy in the High North”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, no. 205, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2010, p. 5. 
41 A journey on the NSR generally requires the use of two icebreakers. 
42 M. Humpert, “EU Arctic Policy: A Memorandum to the European Commission”, The Arctic 
Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, Brussels, May 2011, p. 17. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
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the Northern Sea Route, 43 which  is due to enter into force in February 2013. 44 
According to a European Commission official, it seems that this new piece of 
legislation “is going to resolve a lot of current issues between the EU and Russia over 
the Northern Sea Route”.45 The new law foresees a re-positioning of Russia’s Arctic 
administration under a new Federal Agency in charge of all commercial maritime 
activities along the NSR. This new organisation could  then  speed up the issuing 
process of navigation permits and bring down the costs of transit.46 The law demands 
that vessels using the Route compulsorily subscribe to insurance for civil liability. It also 
reaffirms the state monopoly of the use of icebreakers in the waters of the NSR and 
determines the costs of an icebreaker escort on the basis of the volume of services 
provided. The agency will also assist the setting up of SAR operations along the route. 
More importantly, the law adopts a new definition of the NSR in Russian terms. Under 
this, the NSR includes internal waters, territorial waters, the contiguous zone and the 
EEZ and is delimited at its eastern end by the Bering Strait and in the west by the 
Novaya Zemlya Islands. As a consequence, maritime areas west  of the Novaya 
Zemlya Islands  are not  governed by this new legal regime  and fall under the 
common maritime regulations. 
Only experience of how this new legal framework will be put into effect will be 
able to confirm or contradict the recent statement made by Vitaly Klyuev from the 
Russian Ministry of Transportation:47  
Here we must conform to the conditions of the international UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 1982, which Russia is an adherent of. […] The convention 
establishes that the principle of free maritime traffic is applicable to all seas, 
including territorial seas, exclusive economic zones in the sea, and moreover, the 
open sea where no one has jurisdiction.48 
                                                 
43 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Federal Law n°132-FZ "On amendments to certain legislation of the 
Russian Federation regarding the state regulation of merchant shipping in the waters of the 
Northern Sea Route" [author’s translation], 30 July 2012. 
44 "Vladimir Putin signs law on the Northern Sea Route", Arctic Info, 30 July 2012. 
45 Interview with an official, DG Mare, European Commission, Brussels, 30 March 2012. 
46 A. Vasiliev, Ambassador at Large, Senior Arctic Official of the Russian Federation, “Russian 
perspective on international cooperation in the Arctic”, Speech at Arctic Futures Symposium, 
“The Arctic in a Time of a Change”, 12 October 2011, The Royal Library of Belgium, Brussels, 
Belgium, p. 4. 
47 Deputy director of the department of government policy in the area of sea and river 
transport of the Russian Ministry of Transportation. 
48 Reported by A. Kireeva & C. Digges, “Russia taking on Northern Sea Route as Bellona raises 
alarm over Norwegian vessels under escort of nuclear icebreakers”, Bellona Foundation, 12 
April 2012. Julien Daemers 
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Whereas it  is too early to draw far-reaching conclusions on the new law, it 
appears  to satisfy several EU concerns in speeding up the procedure for issuing 
navigation permits, as well as limiting the requirement to use Russian ice-breakers for 
the eastern part of the coastal route. It is therefore interesting to look at the possible 
impact of EU influence on this shift of position. 
An EU impact on Russian policy on the NSR? 
In similar cases in the past, the EU used its support for the Russian candidacy to 
the WTO as leverage in its relations with Russia. The best example is the case of 
Russian taxes on EU flights over Siberia. What the media called ‘sky taxes’ have been 
a periodic irritant in EU-Russia relations. Considered by the EU and its member states 
as a breach of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Russia 
imposed transit taxes on EU airlines flying over Russian territory even in the absence of 
any landing on Russian soil.49 Although an agreement was reached in 2006 on 
gradually reducing these taxes, it  was not implemented until November 2011, a 
month prior to the WTO’s final approval of the Russian candidacy. Intriguingly, the 
European Commission Press Release presenting the progressive implementation of 
the agreement mentioned a quote from Commissioner Karel De Gucht who linked 
this agreement to Russia’s WTO accession: "The clear commitment we received from 
Russia to make charges  for flying over Siberia cost-related, transparent and non-
discriminatory helped pave the way for the EU to support Russia's accession to the 
WTO. Both of these developments are very good news."50  
A similar concomitance can be observed in the case of the Russian bill 
watering down the shipping regulation on the NSR. However, authors tend to agree 
that, while Russia sees the Arctic as central, it considers the EU as peripheral. As 
noted by  Archer, “with this imbalance, the Arctic region is unlikely to play an 
important role in Russo-EU relations”. 51 Interviewed by the author, a European 
Commission official shared this view in spring 2012.52 Hence, observers should not 
overestimate the size of the Arctic within both the EU and the Russian agendas. 
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This paper rather supports the idea that the EU’s relations with Russia on the 
NSR will be strengthened over time due to technology-related factors, including the 
EU’s space capabilities as well as the European hydrocarbons drilling technologies. 
The Russian need for European technologies 
The EU’s space capabilities 
In addition to its stake in the commercial use of the NSR, the EU owns an asset 
of high value that was made into an EU shared parallel competence by the Lisbon 
Treaty: the EU Space Policy.53 In the Arctic context where geography and climate 
change are crucial, the EU could use this as a competitive advantage to enter the 
Arctic debate. Recognised by a European Commission official as the most notable 
enhancement of the EUAP in the past three years,54 a Staff Working Document on 
this space angle was released in June 2012 in annex to the progress report on the 
EUAP.55 
This  Working Document  supports  the idea that the  EU Space Policy should 
allow the EU to bring an added value to the Arctic in crucial dimensions such as 
navigation, monitoring, data processing, research and communication. Before 
large-scale shipping, fishing or a tourist industry using Arctic routes can develop, SAR 
facilities need to be available with ready-made capacity to provide assistance and 
respond appropriately to an accident involving vessels. The risk of accidents and 
challenges of search and rescue in the Arctic are more serious than anywhere else 
due to freezing temperatures, severe icing, iceberg collision, uncharted waters, and 
the extreme vulnerability of the environment to pollution. The Galileo programme in 
particular  should be able to map the newly ice-freed Arctic areas in very high 
definition and to monitor shipping navigation in near-real time. Such high-level 
capabilities are urgently needed to secure safe transit for shipping in the Arctic. The 
EU holds here a competitive advantage in comparison with other players (such as 
the US and its GPS programme which is not as precise as the Galileo system) and 
holds an asset of high value especially for Canada and Russia, two states that would 
be particularly exposed in case of accidents. Moreover, observed trends suggest 
that Arctic tourism is developing relatively quickly and will increase risks of accidents 
in addition to those affecting commercial shipping. In this  context, developing 
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cooperation between the EU Space Agency and the soon-to-be established Russian 
Federal Agency for the administration of the Northern Sea Route could bring 
legitimacy and credibility to the EUAP.  
The Arctic Council itself has started to tackle this challenge by signing in May 
2011 an Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime SAR in the Arctic. 
This first legally binding agreement under the auspices of the AC, strengthens 
cooperation between AC members and gives each of them a particular SAR area 
for which it is responsible. In general terms, the AC agreement addresses the issue of 
cooperation at the borders of sovereign states rather than setting standards for SAR 
or committing the parties to build or renovate effective infrastructures.56 
In the EU-Russia context, supporting the construction or renovation of SAR 
infrastructure would mean European companies investing on Russian territory, which 
is currently not an option favoured by the Russian authorities.57 
European technology for hydrocarbon extraction 
Interestingly, the Russian Federation is even more reluctant to allow foreign 
investments in its oil and gas sector. Russia requires that foreign companies wishing to 
invest in the Russian oil and gas sector with a share of more than 5% should obtain 
direct approval from the Kremlin.58 The Russian authorities consider this sector as 
related to national security and therefore limit foreign investments. Nevertheless, in 
the case of the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea, the Russian authorities 
welcomed investments by European companies – namely the French TOTAL and the 
Norwegian Statoil. A consortium was set up comprising Gazprom (51% of the shares), 
TOTAL (25%) and Statoil (24%).59 Although the consortium ended in July 2012 due to 
the  exit of Statoil,60 this pragmatism when it comes to one of the world’s largest 
natural gas fields was related to the Russian lack of technology for offshore drilling. 
The European companies brought to the consortium advanced offshore technology 
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available nowhere else on the market. Norway was in this respect a key player in the 
equation. 
To conclude, the EU does not have a  very strong leverage over Russia’s 
interpretation of the NSR’s status. Nevertheless, the EU and its closely  connected 
neighbours Norway and Iceland do have competitive advantages to offer the 
Russian authorities when it comes to space capabilities and oil and gas offshore 
drilling technologies. However, given the economic and financial crisis which has 
had strong impacts both in the EU and Russia, China is likely to have an increasing 
role in the Arctic in future as the financier for the creation of all these very costly 
infrastructures. 
3.   The EU-China convergence and divergence of interests in the Arctic 
The European Union and China share a wide range of interests in the Arctic, 
notably on scientific research and on economic opportunities. Unexpectedly, on the 
latter, the EU and China also agree on supporting a legal regime of free shipping on 
Arctic routes in  contradiction to traditional Chinese policy on sovereignty-related 
issues. This convergence of interests indicates room for cooperation between the two 
non-Arctic actors in the future. However, while facing similar challenges over 
recognition, they adopt different strategies. 
The EU-China convergence of interests on Arctic issues 
As  stated clearly by the Chinese Assistant Minister for Foreign  Affairs, Hu 
Zhengyue, in June 2009, the Chinese government does not “have an Arctic 
Strategy”.61 At the same time, the presence of a Chinese official at an Arctic forum 
shows a genuine Chinese interest in the current debate on the Arctic. Moreover, as 
stated by the Special Advisor of the French Ambassador at Large on Polar Issues, 
Laurent Mayet, “it is easy to judge the Chinese interests in Arctic issues by their very 
active attendance  at Arctic Council meetings while being only  an ad-hoc 
observer”.62 
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A similar scientific interest 
According to Jakobson, “China has one of the world’s stronger polar scientific 
research capabilities”.63 Indeed, since 1999, China has been showing interest to 
cooperate with Arctic littoral states in terms of scientific research both on climate 
change and Arctic transportation. China organised five scientific expeditions in the 
Arctic (in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2010 and 2012), actively participated in the International 
Polar Year in 2007 and 2008, and launched in October 2003 the world’s largest Arctic 
scientific base at Ny-Ålesund in Svalbard. In addition to this, China owns one 
icebreaker and is planning to build a new one by 2014.64 Analysed by observers as a 
shift in Chinese activism in the Arctic,  the  fifth scientific research expedition  was 
organised during the summer of 2012 by the Chinese authorities. While the four first 
expeditions conducted research mainly in the Bering Sea, this expedition sailed, for 
the first time, from Shanghai (China) to Reykjavik (Iceland) using the Northern Sea 
Route and is likely to return to China using the Transpolar Route to reach Shanghai. 
This journey of approximately 15’000 kilometres was highly mediatised, notably due 
to a partnership with the well-known Iceland-based website called the Arctic Portal. 
These scientific research activities are conducted under the framework of the Polar 
Research Institute of China and the Chinese Arctic and Antarctica Administration65 
(a body from the Chinese State Oceanic Administration). 
Similarly, as stressed in a Working Document accompanying the 2012 report of 
the European Commission and the EEAS, “the EU and its Member States have made 
a leading contribution to Arctic research over the last 10 years”.66 The EU developed 
research projects on climate change, contaminants and health, infrastructure, 
environmental technologies, capacity building, reporting, monitoring and mapping, 
space and soil.67 For instance, it invested in the development of the European Polar 
Research Icebreaker Aurora Borealis  or in collaborative research projects  such as 
DAMOCLES68 in which China participated69 (EU contribution: € 16.5 millions).70 Both 
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for the EU and China, investing in scientific research is a relatively easy way to gain 
legitimacy without being perceived as too invasive by the Arctic coastal states. 
Moreover, Lasserre supports the idea that there is no linkage between China’s 
scientific interest in the Arctic and its economic objectives, both in terms of shipping 
routes and hydrocarbons access.71 This is confirmed by comparing Chinese research 
conducted in the Arctic with that in Antarctica. Indeed, while China conducted four 
scientific expeditions in the Arctic, 28 expeditions have already been conducted 
since 1945 to the Antarctica, where economic opportunities are non-existent due to 
the Antarctica Treaty System.  
Nevertheless, a linkage might  be found between  the development of 
scientific research and climate change concerns. Although  the  standard  Brussels 
perspective sees China and the  protection of the environment as rather 
contradictory terms, the  reality is  more complex. China has a strong interest in 
protecting the Arctic environment, which has effects on its three North East 
provinces, commonly called Manchuria in English, 72 where approximately 8% of 
China’s total population  live. For the Chinese authorities, the protection of the 
Manchurian environment is crucial in order to avoid political instability in the region 
and thus protect the regime. Moreover, it could be argued that conducting climate 
change research is the best way to adapt to climate change, notably when it 
comes to identifying economic opportunities. Therefore, even if the EU’s and Chinese 
concerns on the Arctic environment could be seen as of different nature, the two 
players are again encountering a convergence of interests. 
Taking advantages of new economic opportunities  
In addition to threats, the ice melting in the Arctic region is also producing 
economic opportunities: the opening of new shipping routes as well as access to 
new fields of hydrocarbons. Commercial shipping carries 90% of all international 
trade,73 and the EU holds 41% of the total world shipping fleet.74 Moreover, the EU is 
China’s biggest trading partner. China has recognised the potential of these new 
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shipping routes by investing in its second icebreaker. This will reduce the Russian grip 
on foreign shipping companies by creating an opportunity to replace  Russian 
icebreakers in the NSR with Chinese icebreakers. Moreover, with the EU, China is the 
only player with the ability to guarantee Canada or Russia a high  frequency of 
shipping traffic on those routes. This planning possibility is very  relevant when the 
moment arrives for  the coastal states  to assess the profitability of  very expensive 
infrastructure investments along these routes. 
One of the  most interesting convergences  of views between the EU and 
China concerns the legal status of both the NWP and the NSR. As detailed above, 
the EU is defending its right of innocent passage in both routes. While China has not 
directly  expressed  a position on these passages, it supports the idea that the 
International Maritime Organisation  (IMO)  should play a crucial role in order “to 
improve the legal framework for Arctic shipping cooperation”.75 Therefore, it seems 
clear that China is seeking free access for itself to these passages. By extension, on 
the one hand, it supports a right of innocent passage in the NSR. On the other hand, 
the NWP is considered an international strait and not as Canadian domestic waters. 
In taking this position, China is also in line with the United States. As stated by 
Jakobson, “based on official statements by the Chinese Government and the open-
source literature written by Chinese Arctic scholars, China can be expected to 
continue to persistently, yet quietly and unobtrusively, push for the Arctic in spirit 
being accessible to all”.76 
This convergence of views is unexpected given that the traditional Chinese 
foreign policy line is to protect sovereignty at any cost. On the one hand, the 
Chinese authorities have always defended the idea that waters between the 
Chinese coast and Taiwan should not be considered as an international strait but as 
domestic Chinese waters. On the other hand, they apply the same reasoning to the 
Hainan Island strait in the south of China.77 The convergence of views in the Arctic is 
a good starting point for an enhanced discussion between China and the EU based 
on the wish of both to protect their future economic prospects in these shipping 
routes. 
                                                 
75 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s View on Arctic 
Cooperation”, Speech - High North Study Tour, 30 July 2010. 
76 Jakobson, op.cit., p. 13. 
77 Lasserre, “China and the Arctic”, op.cit., p. 8. BRIGG Paper 4/2012 
21 
Obviously, China has an interest in the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic 
due to its increasing oil consumption. It should be noted that, in contradistinction 
from the EU, China does not see the potential of the Arctic gas fields as strategic, 
since its energy mix is relatively poor in gas compared to coal. Due to the fact that 
the sovereignty over these resources is not contested, China sees rather opportunities 
for investments in the Arctic and, even if it does not have the necessary technology, 
it holds a crucial asset: its big annual growth and associated investment potential. 
However, this should be seen as a medium to long-term interest. In fact, there are no 
large-scale actions by Chinese oil companies that would confirm this hypothesis for 
the moment.78 
The EU and China thus share a wide range of interests. However, they face 
difficulties in being recognised as players in Arctic politics due to the fact that neither 
of them is a littoral actor. Nevertheless, this state of affairs could be turned into an 
opportunity for the EU and China to draft a joint strategy for defining their common 
interests and thus being recognised as relevant Arctic actors. 
An EU-China partnership for international recognition in the Arctic? 
Chinese scholars are criticising the Chinese authorities for their lack of a 
comprehensive strategy towards the Arctic. As discussed by Jakobson, such a wide 
range of critics against the authorities is relatively rare.79 For instance, in answering 
questions for the Beijing newspaper  Cankao Xiaoxi,  Guo Peiqing of the Ocean 
University of China opines that China should be more ambitious in its relations with 
the Arctic region: “any country that lacks comprehensive research on Polar politics 
will be excluded from being a decisive power in the management of the Arctic and 
therefore be forced into a passive position”.80 The Chinese authorities are much 
more reluctant than the academic community to develop a comprehensive 
strategy. In adopting a “wait-and-see approach”,81 they learn from the EU’s mistakes 
in its development of an Arctic policy. 
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The Arctic Council: a missed opportunity for cooperation between the EU and China 
Simultaneously with the EU and in full compliance with the traditional Chinese 
policy of joining non-binding cooperative fora in order to prevent any contestation 
of sovereignty,82 China applied in 2009 for a Permanent Observer status within the 
AC, recognising this forum  as the primary body to deal with Arctic issues. 
Interestingly, China and the EU promoted their applications using similar arguments. 
As a non-coastal Arctic state, China argues that Arctic states and non-Arctic 
states  have their interests “intertwined”.83 This shows clear similarities with the EU’s 
wording, for instance in an October 2011 speech by Maria Damanaki, Commissioner 
for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries: “And what happens in the Arctic ocean, has 
consequences for the rest of the world and obviously for the European Union.”84 
The AC member states  rejected  China’s and the EU’s applications for 
Permanent Observer status in April 2009. In such a situation, it may be natural for 
these two actors to analyse their rejection together and develop a common strategy 
for their future application. Both of them submitted new applications  due to be 
discussed in 2013. Interviews conducted in Brussels in spring 2012 by the author 
indicate, however, that no such cooperation happened. 85 Indeed, there is in 
practice no particular discussion between the European Commission and China on 
Arctic issues. Their day-to-day relations are even coloured by suspicion. Indeed, while 
answering this question, a European Commission official mentioned to the author: 
“the Chinese come to us to request information but they don’t give any in return”.86 
This reluctance to connect their position and develop linkages between the 
EU and China can be explained as a strategy to maximise each actor’s chances to 
join the AC. Indeed, a close cooperation  between the EU and China could be 
frightening for the AC members. This reasoning is in line with the “China threat 
theory”,87 which consists in analysing any Chinese action as a threat due to its 
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increasing power on the global stage.88 This atmosphere of suspicion could also be 
applied by extension to the EU in the event of formalised China-EU cooperation on 
Arctic issues.  
Nevertheless, these two major players in international affairs may be following 
a rather fragile strategy by seeking to join the forum simply as Permanent Observers. 
Indeed, the AC is currently debating about the role that Observers should have in 
the forum.89 The debate does not only concern the difference of status between ad 
hoc Observers and Permanent Observer, but seeks to determine whether the forum 
needs Observers at all. Therefore, all the current Permanent Observers (France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom) are potentially in 
the same position as China and the EU are: on an ’ejector seat’. In order to influence 
the AC in this discussion, it seems that ad hoc Observers and Permanent Observers 
are informally pressuring the AC with the implicit threat that they could discuss Arctic 
issues together in another forum in case of rejection. Indeed, interviews conducted 
by the author tend to confirm this idea.90 However, it should be noted that such 
unofficial consultations take only place during sessions and do not continue in 
intersession periods.91 The EU could be in a favourable position to set up such a forum 
as it is already very active in regional cooperation on Arctic-related issues through 
the  Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BAEC), of which the EU is a member, and the 
Northern Dimension, a common policy framework including the EU, Iceland, Norway 
and Russia. 
Lessons for China from the EU’s youthful mistakes? 
China supports the introduction of a new legal framework for the Arctic region 
to complement UNCLOS, to which it has been a party since 1996.92 The European 
Parliament strongly supported the negotiation of  a  new legal regime,  taking into 
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consideration the specificities of the Arctic region. 93 Watered down in the 2008 
Communication, the Commission was asking for an assessment of “the effectiveness 
of Arctic-relevant multilateral agreements to determine whether additional initiatives 
or measures are needed”.94 In line with the Council, which discarded this proposal in 
its 2009 Council Conclusions due to vocal reactions from Arctic states, the European 
Parliament does no longer support the introduction of an Arctic treaty.95  
Interestingly, in contrast to earlier EU documents, China is not supporting the 
introduction of a new treaty comparable to the Antarctica Treaty System. It rather 
supports a treaty model based on the Svalbard Treaty. Jia Yu, from the Chinese State 
Oceanic Administration, argues that such a new treaty could secure China’s right of 
innocent passage, while the coastal states  would see their full and absolute 
sovereignty preserved over their passages. 96 Interestingly, this is more-or-less the 
analysis of the former Member of the European Parliament Dania Wallis, the strongest 
supporter of a new legal regime in the Arctic.97  
Such a convergence of analysis does not mean that the EU and China 
support or supported a new treaty for the same reasons. Indeed, China’s primary 
reason for such a position could be construed as support for the Chinese raw 
materials policy, as the Svalbard Treaty allows resource exploitation by all signatories 
within its purview. Supporting a new set of Arctic rules on raw materials exploitation 
could be a way for China to access new extraction fields and new markets. 
However, such an assumption  could limit EU-China potential cooperation on an 
Arctic treaty. On the one hand, the EU has no interest in supporting China in its policy 
of directly accessing raw materials in other countries or regions. On the other hand, 
the EU, the US and Japan recently brought a complaint to the Dispute Settlement 
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Body of the WTO accusing China of restricting the exportation of rare earths, one of 
the most valuable groups of raw materials.98 
Moreover, in contradiction to the  European Parliament's proposal, China is 
supporting the introduction of a new legal regime for the Arctic only as a 
complement to UNCLOS. It is very careful to recall the sovereign rights of the coastal 
states: ”in accordance with the UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic 
states  have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic 
region, while non-Arctic  states  also enjoy rights of scientific research and 
navigation”.99 
Second, China is building up its relations with Arctic indigenous communities. 
The EU’s relations with these communities are in general very good. The EU includes 
indigenous issues both in its human rights policies and in its development policies. For 
instance, in the framework of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR), a project for Arctic and Sub-Arctic indigenous peoples has been 
established in order to pursue traditional livelihoods in strengthening capacity 
building in Russia.100 These relations have even been institutionalised to a certain 
extent, for instance  through the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region101 or within the BAEC (Working Group of Indigenous Peoples and The Barents 
Indigenous Peoples Office). 
However, the European  Parliament’s  decision to ban seal products in the 
European internal market had a serious impact in the EU’s relations with indigenous 
communities, 102  notably those in Canada,  although  the EU exempted these 
communities from the ban a year later.103 It is worth noting that while Canada is suing 
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the EU before the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body, Canada concluded in January 
2011 a market access agreement with China for the exportation of seal products.104 
This agreement was particularly well perceived by the  Canadian indigenous 
communities, for instance by the Canadian Inuit leader Mary Simon, who stated:  
The size of the Chinese market and rapid growth of the Chinese economy makes 
this particularly good news for Inuit and our interests in expanding our market 
opportunities for seal skin products. I’m pleased that the Chinese government has 
seen through the myths and distortions that have been widely disseminated by 
animal rights extremists in other parts of the world, such as Europe. We want to 
create a stable and secure future for our seal hunters.105  
 
This agreement should provide China with indigenous community support in 
the AC, where the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) has permanent voting rights. 
Moreover, China is showing a growing interest in the Arctic raw materials which is 
perfectly illustrated by the November 2011 visit of Karl Ove Berthelsen, Greenland’s 
Minister for Natural Resources, to China where he was received by the Chinese Vice 
Premier Li Keqiand, most likely to become the next Chinese Prime Minister.106 
Therefore, although the interests of China and the EU are converging to a 
large extent on Arctic issues, the two partners do not cooperate in order to maximise 
their chances to become recognised as relevant Arctic players. This is also illustrated 
by the last visit of the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, to Iceland and Sweden in 
April 2012. While the Chinese Prime Minister discussed the Chinese application for the 
AC Observer Status, he did not make the same step towards the EU.107 Nevertheless, 
the EU should be proactive in taking a step toward China by trying to develop a 
dialogue on this convergence of interests. Indeed, as stated by Bailes, “it is widely 
assumed that China, Japan and South Korea would be among the earliest and most 
powerful non-Arctic nations to be drawn into the game as and when transit and 
investment possibilities in the polar region are opened up”.108 China is not the only 
Asian country potentially interested in the Arctic. This could lead to cooperation 
between China and Japan, generating the “genuine win-win situation”109 wished by 
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Jakobson. A successful cooperation between the EU and China could thus open up 
a new era of cooperation with other East Asian countries in which China would like 
to be a driver.110 
4.   Conclusions: towards future cooperation in the Arctic 
This paper explored the role the EU’s Arctic Policy could play in the European 
Union’s relations with two of its crucial strategic partners: Russia and China. It has 
shown that the EUAP currently lacks strong leverage to influence Russia over the EU’s 
interests in the NSR. Moreover, while the EU and China clearly share specific interests 
in the Arctic, the analysis has indicated that the EU does not use the EUAP as a tool 
to cooperate with China in getting recognition as legitimate actors. 
  However,  the political situation in the Arctic is evolving as fast as its ice is 
melting. In order to gain credibility as an Arctic player, the EU has to develop the 
EUAP.  To  strengthen its position in the Russian case, the EU should  develop its 
competitive advantages such as space capabilities and oil and gas offshore drilling 
technologies, which could prove its added value in the exploitation of the NSR. The 
promotion of this added value should be done within the AC as well as within all the 
sub-regional organisations where  the EU has a say, such as the BAEC  and  the 
Northern Dimension. This would also leave the EU in a better position to face any 
potential decision of the AC to exclude all Observers from its framework. 
Aside from facing similar difficulties in becoming recognised as relevant Arctic 
players, the EU and China currently agree to a large extent in terms of their views on 
the Arctic, which could pave the way for future cooperation. However, neither of 
the two actors is ready yet to develop a partnership on the issue. It even seems that 
China is busy learning from the EU’s youthful mistakes  in Arctic policymaking. 
Nevertheless, the EU is not in an inextricable position, and making a calculated first 
step towards cooperation could produce some valuable results. Moreover, the EU 
should continue to convince Sweden, Finland, and potentially Iceland, to actively 
promote the role of the EU as an actor when the Chinese authorities lobby them for 
their support for China’s application to the AC. 
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To conclude, this study has also attempted to combat simplistic approaches 
towards the Arctic. Many observers, both from academia and journalism, emphasise 
the risk of a ‘new Cold War’, a new ’gold rush’ for resources or a piece of the ‘Arctic 
cake’. While the Russian flag episode partly accounts for this state of affairs, the lack 
of knowledge has been at the core of these exaggerations. The complexity of the 
region should compel analysts to be cautious about any knee-jerk conclusions. As a 
non-Arctic organisation, the EU faced and still faces this ‘knowledge challenge’ in 
shaping the EUAP. As stated in June 2010 by Alexander Stubb with regard to the 
project for an EU Arctic Information Centre, “even though today’s world is like a 
global village, quick and convenient access to accurate information is still a 
challenge. Lack of knowledge breeds suspicion and uncertainty”.111 The Commission 
recognised this weakness at an early stage in seeking to draft a balanced policy 
protecting the interests of the EU and its member states. 
In response to the famous Inuit proverb “you never really know your friends 
from your enemies until the ice breaks”, the EU is committed to demonstrate that it 
has been, and still is, an authentic friend of the Arctic. 
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